How do Institutional Investors Trade when Firms are Buying Back Shares? by HUANG, Sheng & ZHANG, Zhe (Joe)
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
10-2012
How do Institutional Investors Trade when Firms
are Buying Back Shares?
Sheng HUANG
Singapore Management University, shenghuang@smu.edu.sg
Zhe ( Joe) ZHANG
Singapore Management University, joezhang@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the Portfolio and Security
Analysis Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
HUANG, Sheng and ZHANG, Zhe ( Joe). How do Institutional Investors Trade when Firms are Buying Back Shares?. (2012).
Financial Management Association Annual Meetings, Atlanta, 18-20 October 2012. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3492
How do institutional investors trade when firms 
are buying back shares? 
 
Sheng Huang 
50 Stamford Road LKC School of Business 
Singapore Management University 
Singapore 178899 
Tel: 65-68280252 
Email: shenghuang@smu.edu.sg 
 
 
Zhe Zhang 
50 Stamford Road LKC School of Business 
Singapore Management University 
Singapore 178899 
Tel: 65-68280727 
Email: joezhang@smu.edu.sg 
 
 
	  
1	  
	  
	  
 
How do institutional investors trade when firms are 
buying back shares? 
  
 
 
 
Abstract 
We study how institutional investors trade when firms buy back shares. We find that aggregate 
institutional ownership decline following share repurchase announcements. While some 
institutions sell shares passively to meet the firm demand for the market to clear, the overall 
institutional sell-off only accounts for 27% of shares bought back contemporaneously by firms. 
Many firms experience a net inflow of institutional investment. The decrease in institutional 
shareholding is greater in firms that experience weaker recent stock performance, display more 
information uncertainty, have higher institutional ownership, and conduct ill-timed/motivated 
repurchases that are not endorsed by institutions. And most of the sell-off comes from 
institutions active in trading. Institutional buying is more informative of the future returns than 
institutional sell-off, especially in firms with greater information asymmetry. But this return 
predictability decays over time. Our findings have important implications for firms’ cash 
payout policy and shed light on institutional trading behavior around voluntary corporate 
events.  
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1. Introduction 
      Share repurchase has been increasingly become a dominant payout mode over 
dividends in the last decade or so (Grullon and Michaely, 2002; and Skinner, 2008). Unlike 
dividends, repurchases involve a wealth transfer between tendering and withholding 
shareholders, as informed shareholders are able to exploit uninformed others by either 
withholding undervalued shares or selling overvalued shares (Brennan and Thakor, 1990); 
hence it would impose the security valuation costs on shareholders. Institutional investors 
typically hold the majority of the shares, and they arguably have better access to 
information and can process information less costly, and thus are at advantage in share 
repurchases relative to individual investors. Therefore, understanding the institutional 
trading behavior is of vital importance in understanding the implications of share 
repurchase on the composition of shareholder base, market efficiency, and investor welfare. 
However, little has been done in the literature to examine how institutions make use of 
their informational advantage and trade when firms buy back shares. We intend to fill this 
gap in this paper.   
      Specifically, we first document institutional trading patterns following repurchase 
announcements. We then explore a number of possible explanations for the institutional 
trading behavior. Moreover, we examine the informational role of institutions by examining 
the performance of buy-back stocks following institutional trading.  
      Documenting institutional trading pattern is of interest on its own right – ex ante, it is 
not obvious how institutions would react to repurchase announcements, and there is little 
empirical evidence. Institutions (especially passive ones) may simply supply shares and 
provide liquidity in response to the demand shock from repurchasing firms. However, the 
complexity of information environment around share repurchases, as explained below, may 
lead to different predictions on the direction and intensity of institutional trading. On the 
one hand, institutions being better informed, may exploit the long-run price drift following 
3	  
	  
	  
repurchase announcements and load up their shares.1 On the other hand, they may sell 
under certain circumstances.  
      First, while a tender-offer repurchase usually signals a firm’s undervaluation, it is not 
always so for an open-market repurchase (OMR hereinafter).2 In practice, there is abundant 
evidence suggesting that managers often have timed the market poorly in repurchase 
decisions (see, e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2008; and Jiang and Koller, 2011). 
Second, managers could manipulate information flows before repurchases by providing 
downward-biased earnings forecasts (Brockman, Khurana, and Martin, 2008) or through 
downward earnings management (Gong, Louis, and Sun, 2008). Third, even some 
sophisticated market participants like analysts can get it persistently wrong on 
repurchasing firms’ valuation. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) show that analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are too pessimistic before repurchases and analysts do not change their minds as a 
results of the buyback announcements. Overall, it would be interesting to see whether and 
how institutions, especially those active in trading, read through the value implications of 
firm repurchase decisions.  
We empirically examine these issues by investigating institutional trading upon open-
market repurchase announcements and up to two subsequent quarters, a quarterly window 
(0, 2), between 1985 and 2008. We focus on this relatively short-period window out of two 
considerations. First, institutional trading over a long period may be noisy in capturing its 
informativeness.  Second, while firms could span the execution of their announced open-
market repurchase programs over a period of one to three years, actual repurchases 
typically follow soon after the announcements (Lie, 2005). To account for any other factors 
than repurchases that potentially affect institutional trading, we contrast institutional 
trading of sample firms with simultaneous institutional trading of a control sample of non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) find evidence that transient institutional investors trade to exploit the post-
earnings announcement drift. 
2 See related discussions by Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Huang and Thakor (2011).	  The literature has identified 
that OMRs can also be used to deter a takeover attempt (Bagwell, 1991), to concentrate the share ownership into the 
hands of investors whose belief is more aligned with the manager’s (Huang and Thakor, 2011), to offset dilution 
from stock options (Fenn and Liang, 2001; and Kahle, 2002), to pay out temporary cash flows (Guay and Harford, 
2000; and Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach, 2000), to inflate earnings-per-share especially when it may 
otherwise fall short of the analysts’ forecast (Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson, 2006), or they can be a strategic response 
to a rival firm’s repurchase decision (Massa, Rehman, and Vermaelen, 2007).  
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repurchasing firms with similar characteristics such as market capitalizations, book-to-
market, prior stock returns, and past institutional ownership and trading.  
      Our analysis using quarterly institutional ownership data (13F) yields interesting 
findings of institutional investor behavior. We find a sell-off by institutions during our 
examination quarterly window (t, t+2), and most of the sell-off takes place in the 
announcement quarter t. Institutions thus appear not concerned with the long-run positive 
price drift in repurchasing firms documented earlier in the literature (e.g., Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009). On average, institutions sell 
about 2% of their total holdings. And the decline in institutional ownership is not explained 
by other firm characteristics or the general market trend in institutional trading, as 
institutions in control firms increase their holdings persistently during the same time 
window.  
      The quarterly ownership data cannot identify the exact date of trading. To address this 
concern, we make use of a sample of transaction-level institutional trading data which helps 
to delineate institutional trading before the announcement from that after the 
announcement. We find that the institutional sell-off in the announcement quarter takes 
place after the announcement and is concentrated in days immediately following the 
announcement.   
      There is a great heterogeneity in trading behavior across different types of institutions. 
We find that institutions that are active in trading (such as independent investment 
companies and investment advisors) react more quickly to repurchase announcements than 
those that are typically passive in trading (such as banks and insurance companies). The 
sell-off by active institutions in the announcement quarter accounts for the majority of the 
trading by institutions. And the sell-off does not continue into, nor does it get reversed in 
the two subsequent quarters. In contrast, passive institutions seem to smooth their selling 
during the examination window while they barely change their ownership in the control 
firms at the same time.  
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      Institutions selling shares may be simply providing shares for the market to clear, 
especially when there is a large share demand from the firms and the trading costs are low. 
We find that they do sell more when firms announce larger repurchase programs and when 
the firms’ shares are more liquid. However, we find that institutions supply only 27% of 
shares actually bought back by firms contemporaneously. Given the disproportionally low 
amount of share supply from institutions and the rich information environment around 
firms’ repurchase decisions as discussed earlier, it is worthwhile exploring alternative 
explanations for the decline in the institutional ownership.  
      First, we examine whether institutions trade on momentum. Firms typically announce 
share repurchases following poor stock returns. Consistent with momentum trading, the 
overall decline in institutional ownership is greater in firms with lower prior stock returns. 
This trading pattern is more pronounced with passive institutions. However, momentum 
trading cannot fully explain the change in institutional ownership because the magnitude of 
the abnormal sell-off is greater than that of the raw sell-off. Second, given that repurchase 
announcement returns are typically positive, the institutional selling appears to be 
consistent with profit taking. This return-contrarian manner of institutional trading may 
slow down the price adjustment and contributes to the post-repurchase price drift. But 
institutions appear to sell for reasons beyond profit-taking per se, because we find no 
evidence that they sell more upon higher announcement returns.  
      Third, Brennan and Thakor (1990) suggest that uninformed shareholders will never 
tender their shares in open-market repurchases if informed ownership is sufficiently high. 
We thus test if institutions as informed investors sell more in firms with higher prior 
institutional ownership. Our finding confirms this prediction. Fourth, we show above that 
institutions disproportionally sell less relative to individual investors, suggesting that some 
institutions are actively buying upon the news. Since the repurchase announcement is a 
noisy signal of the firm value, the cost of trading and arbitrage is higher when investors 
face higher information uncertainty. We hence expect less buying and more net selling for 
firms with more uncertain information environment. We show evidence consistent with 
this prediction. 
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      Furthermore, some repurchases may have been ill timed and thus institutions are more 
likely to sell their shares. Firms could be buying back shares when their shares are highly 
valued, or they could fail to build a cash cushion against slowdown in growth while 
spending heavily on repurchases. These firms often observe their post-repurchase stock 
prices drop subsequently below their repurchase prices. And the repurchases clearly benefit 
the selling investors at the cost of withholding shareholders. For example, there was a spike 
in repurchases before the burst of the high-tech bubble when most firms’ valuations were 
not low. We find that institutions sold significantly more when firms were buying back 
shares in 1998-1999.  
      More generally, it is difficult to measure ex ante how well a repurchase is timed. We try 
to tackle this by studying whether institutions endorse managerial decisions in 
repurchasing firms through their trading prior to repurchase announcements. Intuitively, a 
firm’s decision to buy back shares might not be as a good timing when institutional 
investors are buying strongly into the firm’s stock as when institutional investors are 
fleeing away from it. We then examine how institutions react to repurchases differently in 
firms with different prior institutional trading. We find that institutions sell significantly 
more upon repurchase announcements if the firms have experienced a greater increase in 
institutional ownership prior to the announcements. This pattern is more pronounced for 
the period of 1998-1999. Consistent with the poorer repurchase timing, in the year 
subsequent to repurchase announcements, firms with top tercile of prior institutional 
trading underperform by 5.27% in stock returns compared to those with bottom tercile of 
prior institutional trading.  
      Lastly, there is evidence that institutions are informed in their trading. While the overall 
institutional ownership declines upon repurchases, many firms experience a net inflow of 
institutional investment. Stock purchases are more informative about future returns than 
stock selling by institutions. Firms with the most increase in institutional ownership 
significantly outperform their matched counterparties over the following year, while firms 
with the most decrease in institutional ownership do not outperform or even underperform. 
Yet, the return predictability is limited to trading by active institutions, and it decays over a 
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longer time period. Taken together with passive institutions’ smooth trading which is 
aligned with the typical pace of firm buybacks on the open market over time,3 we conclude 
that trading by passive institutions mostly serves the purpose of liquidity provision. 
Consistent with its informativeness, we find that active institutional trading has better 
return predictability in small and growth firms and in firms that have experienced poorer 
stock returns prior to repurchases.  
      Overall, institutions sell their holdings upon firm repurchases. They tend to trade on 
momentum and take profits upon positive announcement returns. But momentum trading 
and profit-taking do not explain fully the net institutional selling. There is evidence that 
institutions abandon stocks with ill-timed/motivated repurchases. Trading by active 
institutions accounts for most of the institutional trading, and it appears to be informed, 
especially when they purchase opaque stocks and stocks with poor recent performance. 
Institutions (in particular passive institutions) also serve to provide shares in market 
clearing when there is a demand for shares from firms, while the primary source of shares 
comes from individual investors. 
      Grinstein and Michaely (2005) examine how institutional ownership is related to a firm’s 
repurchase policy using yearly data. Our study differs primarily in that our examination 
focus is different. Using quarterly and daily trading data, we examine how institutions react 
to repurchase announcements and trade when firms are buying back shares. They look at 
how institutions trade in the year after repurchases, and find an increase in institutional 
ownership. Our focus on institutions’ contemporaneous trading in a shorter time window 
enables us to capture the informativeness and other reasons of institutional trading than the 
longer-term clientele effect of repurchases as suggested by their finding. Moreover, their 
study covers an early sample period ending in 1996. Our sample is the most comprehensive 
to date spanning the period of 1985-2008 and captures the spikes in repurchases in the last 
15 years. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In accelerated repurchase programs, firms typically accumulate all required shares in a short time period. However, 
this type of intensive repurchase program only emerges and gets more attention in the last several years. The 
aggregate magnitude of accelerated repurchases is small, compared with that of open-market repurchases. For a 
detailed study of accelerated repurchases, see Bargeron, Kulchania, and Thomas (2011). We do not include 
accelerated repurchases in this study.     
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      For the rest of the paper, we proceed as follows. In Section 2, we discuss data, sample 
selection, and construction of matched firms. We then present our main findings and 
discussions of institutional trading in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Data description  
      Our data come from several sources. Our initial sample of repurchases, obtained from 
Securities Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. database, contains all open-market share 
repurchases announced during the period from 1985 to 2008. Repurchases by tender offers 
or privately negotiation are excluded. We drop those repurchases with program size 
smaller than 1% of the firm’s market capitalization as of the prior fiscal year end. If there're 
multiple announcements during a year, we only include the first one.  
      The quarterly institutional ownership data is from CDA/Spectrum provided by 
Thomson Financial. The Security and Exchanges Commission (SEC) requires that all 
institutional managers with $100 million or more in assets under management report equity 
positions over 10,000 shares or $200,000 in their quarterly 13F filings. We calculate the 
quarterly institutional percentage ownership for each stock as the ratio of the number of 
shares held by all 13F institutions at the end of each quarter and the total number of shares 
outstanding. Institutional trading for any given period is then defined as the difference 
between the percentage ownership at the end of the current and the previous period.  
      Besides examining the aggregate institutional ownership and trading, we also report 
results for different types of institutions. The CDA/Spectrum classifies institutions into five 
types: type 1 (banks), type 2 (insurance companies), type 3 (investment companies), type 4 
(independent investment advisors), and type 5 (ESOPs, university endowments, 
foundations, and private and public pension funds). Chen, Hartford, and Li (2007) point out 
that CDA/Spectrum’s type classification is not accurate beyond 1998 due to a mapping 
error. Many of the institutions are improperly classified as type 5 institutions. For 
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institutions that existed before 1998, we follow Chen, Hartford, and Li (2007) and apply the 
institutions’ pre-1998 CDA classification to their post-1998 classification. For institutions 
appear in 1998 and after, we manually identify their CDA classification and group them 
accordingly. We then regroup type 1 and type2 institutions as passive institutions (recoded 
as type 1 institutions), and type 3 and type 4 as active institutions (recoded as type 2 
institutions), as similarly done in Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) and Chen, Hartford, 
and Li (2007), among others. Because there is a mix of active and passive institutions within 
type 5, we take the conservative approach and group them separately as other institutions 
(recoded as type 3 institutions).  
      Monthly and daily stock returns, share prices, and stock turnover data are from the 
Center for research in Security Prices (CRSP).  Book value of equity, the SIC two-digit 
industry classification and other firm characteristics are from COMPUSTAT. The data on 
the number of the analyst forecasts is from I/B/E/S. Our main sample period spans from 
January 1985 to December 2008.  
      In part of our analysis we also examine institutional trading at the daily horizon. We 
obtain intro-daily institutional trades from Ancerno, a well-known consulting firm and data 
provider (spun off from Abel/Noser Corp). Ancerno provides complete transaction history 
of their institutional clients. For our purposes, each day we aggregate all institutional trades 
for a stock (net of buy and sell), and calculate the daily institutional trading as the ratio of 
the total number of shares traded during the day and the total number of shares 
outstanding. Our daily sample spans from January 1999 to December 2008.  
2.2. Construction of matching firms 
      Our main goal is to study institutions’ reaction to repurchase announcements and how 
they trade when firms are buying back shares. One may argue that a firm’s repurchase 
decision may be a response to a decline in institutional ownership. Thus, institutions’ post-
announcement trading may be affected by their pre-announcement trading. Further, a 
firm’s repurchase decision comes as a result of other factors which may also be related with 
institutions’ post-announcement trading. To address this issue, for each repurchasing firm 
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in our sample, we find a matching firm that share similar prior institutional ownership 
structure and other firm characteristics, but does not make repurchase announcements 
during any time around the sample event date. We then contrast post-announcement 
institutional trading of sample firms with that of the matching firms. A similar approach 
can be seen in Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003). 
      Specifically, to account for multiple factors that may affect the repurchase decision, we 
adopt a propensity score approach. We first run the following pooled logistic regression 
using all firms in the 13F institutional dataset that have one-quarter-lagged data on the 
market capitalization, past 12-month return, book-to-market ratio, and institutional 
holdings available for the past four quarters:  !"#_!"#$! = !"#$%&!!! + !"!!! + !!",!!! + !"#!!! + !"#!!! + !"#!!! + !"#!!!,   (1) 
where !"#_!"#$! equals one if the firm has a repurchase announcement in quarter t, and 
zero otherwise. !"#$%&!!!, !"!!!, and !!",!!! are the firm’s market capitalization, book-to-
market ratio, and past 12-month return, as available at the end of quarter t-1. !"#!!! to !"#!!!  are the percentage institutional ownership at the end of quarters t-4 to t-1, 
respectively. Since repurchases mechanically change the number of shares outstanding, we 
use the four-quarter-lagged total number of shares outstanding as the common scalar when 
calculating percentage ownership for all periods from quarter t-4 to quarter t+2. By doing 
this, in our examination of the impact of repurchases on institutional ownership later, we 
are able to gauge the change in institutional ownership brought solely by institutions’ 
trading. Such a measure will not be affected by the otherwise mechanical change in the 
denominator (the total number of shares outstanding).  
      We define the predicted value of the above regression as the repurchase propensity 
score for each firm in quarter t. We then find a matching firm that has the closest propensity 
score as the sample firm in the same quarter, which shares the same 2-digit SIC code and 
does not announce repurchases in quarter t, or within two years before or after quarter t. 
Our final sample contains 10119 open-market repurchase announcements for each of which 
a matching firm is available.  
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      Panel A of Table 1 reports the summery statistics of sample firms and matching firms. 
The mean (median) book-to-market ratio for the sample firms is 0.66 (0.54), as opposed to 
0.67 (0.53) for the matched firms. The average past 12-month return for sample (matched) 
firms is 14% (15%), while the median is much smaller at 4% (5%). The differences of the 
book-to-market ratio and the past returns between sample and matched firms are 
statistically insignificant, respectively. The difference of the average firm size as measured 
by a natural logarithm of the market capitalizations (in $millions) between the two firm 
groups is small, 5.97 for sample firms vs. 5.58 for matched firms, despite being statistically 
significant. Sample firms have almost identical institutional holdings as matched firms in 
the four quarters prior to repurchase announcements, with the largest difference being only 
about 0.5% in quarter t-3. In sum, sample firms and their matched counterparts share very 
similar characteristics in general, which validates the selection of the matched firms as good 
controls. Consistent with the findings in earlier literature, the average (median) announced 
repurchase program size amounts to 8% (6%) of the firms’ market capitalizations as of the 
prior fiscal year end. And the average (median) five-day (-2, +2) cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) around repurchase announcements is 3% (2%).   
      Panel B of Table 1 reports institutional trading in the last four quarters as well as in the 
last quarter prior to repurchase announcements. Institutions in sample firms, on average, 
increase their holdings prior to repurchase announcements by 2.4% for the period from 
quarter t-4 to t-1. The increase in institutional ownership persists (increase by 0.6%) during 
quarter t-1 even when it is close to the announcements. The increase is observed in holdings 
by all three types of institutions, while about three quarters of it comes from active 
institutions. By design, there’s little difference in the change in institutional ownership 
between sample and matched firms, reflecting their similar levels of institutional ownership 
in each of the four quarters as shown in Panel A.   
      Given the fact that there is a general trend of institutional ownership increase over the 
sample period, we wonder how typical the increase in institutional ownership in our 
sample and matched firms is. For each sample quarter, we construct an alternative 
institutional trading benchmark, defined as the average institutional trading in that quarter 
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across all firms that are included in the 13F filings. Compared with this benchmark, we find 
that the average increase in institutional ownership in the sample (and matched) firms is 
higher. The abnormal institutional trading is 1.5% from quarter t-4 to quarter t-1, and 0.27% 
for quarter t-1 alone. Again, active institutions account for the bulk of the abnormal trading.  
2.3. Examination window of post-announcement institutional trading 
      To see how institutions react to repurchase announcements, we focus on institutional 
trading in repurchase announcement quarter using quarterly institutional ownership data. 
For a closer examination, we make use of the daily institutional stock transaction data and 
look at how institutions trade around the announcement dates. In order to study how 
institutions trade when firms are buying back shares on the open market, we extend our 
examination to the subsequent two quarters. That is, our examination of post-repurchase 
institutional trading centers on the three-quarter (t, t+2) window. We do not look further 
beyond this window due to the following two considerations.  
      First, although firms can execute their announced repurchase programs over an 
extensive period of one to three years (Stephen and Weisbach, 1998), Lie (2005) finds that 
much of the actual repurchase typically occur during the quarter of (quart t), and the 
quarter after (quarter t+1), the announcements for most firms.4 To take account of cases 
when repurchase announcements are made in the quarter end, we further our examination 
window to one quarter later, quarter t+2. Second, we prefer this relatively short period of 
time because institutional trading over a longer horizon beyond the quarter t+2 is likely 
noisy which confounds our examination of its informativeness about firm repurchases.  
 
3. Institutional trading in quarters (t, t+2) 
      Panel A of Table 2 presents our basic findings on institutional trading during the 
quarterly window (t, t+2) for both sample and matched firms. On average, institutions sell 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In the sample of repurchases in Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), only 15% of firms who announce repurchases do not 
proceed with actual repurchases or the actual repurchases account for less than 1% of the firms’ market value during 
these two quarters. (confirm?) 
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about 0.7 percent of the total shares outstanding in the announcement quarter t. The net 
selling continues in quarter t+1 and t+2 in a decreasing pace, with the selling in t+2 being 
statistically insignificant. Overall, institutions abandon about one percent of the shares 
throughout the three-quarter window, which amounts to 2% of the pre-announcement total 
institutional ownership.  
      Using quarterly institutional ownership data does not distinguish whether the sell-off in 
the announcement quarter takes place before or after the announcements, although it is 
crucial for our examination of whether institutions trade in response to the announcements 
or the announcements follow institutional selling. We address this issue by using the 
institutional transaction-level data from Ancerno, from which we can identify institutions’ 
daily trading around the announcement dates. To have an idea of how representative 
trading by institutions covered in this dataset is, we compare it with the 13f quarterly 
ownership dataset for all firms that are in both Ancerno and 13f. We find that, in aggregate, 
institutional trading in Ancerno typically accounts for about 10% of the overall institutional 
trading identified from 13f.5 We therefore use mainly the 13f quarterly ownership data in 
most of our analysis and employ the daily trading data for robustness checks when 
necessary.  
      Results of institutional trading during the announcement quarter are presented in Panel 
A of Table 8. We find that institutions (that are covered in Ancerno) sell 0.08 percent of 
shares in sample firms in the quarter.6 This is roughly consistent with our finding using the 
quarterly ownership data, given the partial coverage of institutional trading by Ancerno. 
However, most of the selling happens in a period from the announcement date till the 
quarter end. The magnitude of pre-announcement selling (from the beginning of the 
quarter to the day before the announcement date) is insignificant both statistically and 
economically. We also examine several intervals of shorter periods, five-day/one-month 
before and after the announcement date, respectively. We confirm that significant sell-off is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Hu, Ke, and Yu (2011) have a similar finding.  
6 This magnitude of the aggregate quarterly institutional trading in Ancerno is comparable with other studies using 
this dataset (e.g., Jegadeesh and Tang, 2010).   
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only observed in post-announcement periods. Further, a significant part of the sell-off is 
concentrated within five days of the announcement.  
      Overall, the post-announcement institutional selling is a break from the increase in 
institutional holding over the four quarters prior to the announcements as documented in 
Panel B of Table 1. It is also in contrast to the persistent increase in institutional holding 
concurrently in the matched firms. It suggests that the decline in institutional ownership in 
the sample firms is unlikely due to a downward trend in institutional holding on the 
market or the change in other firm characteristics. For robustness, we divide our sample 
into three different time periods, 1985-1992, 1993-2000, and 2001-2008. As shown in Panel B 
of Table 2, the basic trading pattern holds in all three periods. Institutional sell-off is more 
aggressive during 1993-2000 than in the other two periods, possibly because institutions 
sold more intensively in firm repurchases made before the burst of the high-tech bubble 
which we will discuss later.  
      Firms with different market capitalizations (market cap) and book-to-market ratios (bm) 
may have different ownership structure and institutional trading pattern. We sort 
repurchase firms into tercile portfolios and based on their rankings in market capitalization 
and book-to-market ratios. Panel C of Table 2 summaries the results. The trading patterns 
are largely consistent across market cap and bm sorted terciles. For example, the abnormal 
selling for the tercile with the smallest market cap is 2.13% during the quarterly window (t, 
t+2), and that for the tercile with the largest market cap is 1.74%. Similarly, the abnormal 
selling for tercile with the lowest bm is 2.28% during the quarterly window (t, t+2),  and 
2.44% for the tercile with the highest bm, all statistically significant at the 1% level.  
      Institutions vary in their trading styles. We delineate institutional trading based on 
different institution types, and results are reported in Panel A of Table 2 as well. We find 
that both type 1 and type 2 institutions sell, but type 3 institutions trade in a negligible 
magnitude. So hereinafter, we will mainly focus on the first two types. Active institutions 
react swiftly to the repurchase decisions. Their sell-off accounts for the majority of 
institutional trading during the announcement quarter. But they do not appear to extend 
their selling into the subsequent two quarters. Passive institutions, in contrast, tend to 
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smooth their selling in the three quarters. They sell in each quarter, but much less 
intensively. As a comparison, net trading by passive institutions is not distinguishable from 
zero, while active institutions buy substantially in all three quarters.  
 
4. Why do institutions sell when firms are buying? 
       We have shown that institutions appear not concerned with the long-run positive price 
drift following repurchases and sell their holding upon firms’ repurchase announcements. 
In this section, we examine empirically why institutions sell. We look at both the 
institutional raw trading and the abnormal trading relative to the trading in matched firms 
in all the three quarters in the window (t, t+2).  
4.1 Share supply?  
Institutions can simply sell to provide liquidity for the market to clear. We would 
expect that institutions sell more when there is a large demand from the repurchasing firms 
and the trading cost is low. We therefore rank our sample firms into terciles based on the 
announced repurchase program size and the liquidity of the firm’s shares, respectively. 
And then we investigate institutional trading for firms in each ranked tercile. We measure 
the program size as the ratio of the announced total expense on repurchases to the firm’s 
prior-year-end market capitalization, or the ratio of the announced total number of shares 
to be repurchases to the firm’s prior-year-end total number of shares outstanding. We use 
excess share turnover as a proxy for share liquidity, which is defined as the firm’s share 
turnover in the past four quarters in excess of the contemporaneous average share turnover 
for the exchange where the sample firm is listed.  
      We find that, in Panel A of Table 3, the institutional selling, either measured by raw 
trading or abnormal trading, increases in the program size and the excess share turnover. 
And this pattern holds for both active and passive institutions.7 It suggests that institutions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For the sake of brevity, from Table 3 on we omit results for other institutions (type 3), because they only 
consist a small fraction of institutions, and their trading can be inferred from all institutional trading and 
the trading by type 1 and type 2 institutions.  
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are supplying shares when it is less costly in doing so and when demands for shares are 
stronger. However, as shown in Table 1, the magnitude of the average institutional selling is 
less than one percent of the firms’ shares. It is small relative to the average (median) 
announced repurchase size which is eight (six) percent of the firm’s shares.  Panel A of Table 
3 shows that the raw institutional selling for the largest program size tercile is 1.29% for the 
announcement quarter, and 2.07% during the quarterly window (t, t+2), both numbers 
small relative to the announced repurchase size. Firms may not complete the announced 
programs by buying back all shares intended within the three quarters. We thus calculate 
an approximation of the actual repurchases conducted in this period using the quarterly 
Compustat item #93. We find that the institutional selling only accounts for 27% of all 
shares actually bought back by firms at the same time. The majority of shares supplied in 
the market clearing are from individual investors.  
      The disproportionately small amount of shares supplied by institutions suggests that 
institutions are net buyers of shares in many firms. Indeed, the raw institutional selling in 
the smallest program size tercile is not significantly different from zero. Further, given the 
rich information environment around firm repurchases discussed in the introduction, it is 
worthwhile exploring some alternative explanations of why institutions sell more in some 
firms than in others. Meanwhile, we will also investigate the extent of which institutional 
trading is informed. In these tests, we rank sample firms into terciles based on different firm 
characteristics related to the potential explanations of institutional trading, and examine 
how institutions trade in each of the ranked terciles (high/medium/low). The related firm 
characteristics include 6-month stock returns prior to repurchase announcements, five-day 
(-2, 2) announcement abnormal returns, pre-announcement institutional ownership, 
idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns, market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and 
institutional trading in the four quarters prior to announcements. The motivation of using 
these variables will be explained below in each of our tests.  
4.2 Momentum trading? 
      We test whether institutions are trading on momentum. Momentum-trading institutions 
would sell more in firms that have experienced worse stock returns prior to repurchase 
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announcements. In Panel B of Table 3, we find some support of this hypothesis. The decline 
in institutional ownership is most in firms of the low tercile of prior 6-month returns. This 
trading pattern is more pronounced for passive institutions than active ones. In firms of the 
high prior returns tercile, the selling by passive institutions in our examination window is 
insignificant both economically and statistically.  
      However, we find that the magnitude of the abnormal trading is greater than that of the 
raw trading. Institutions do not sell or sell as much holding in the matched firms that have 
experienced similar performance as sample firms. It indicates that momentum trading does 
not explain fully institutional sell-off when firms are buying back shares. Moreover, trading 
by active institutions seems to be out of other motives that remain to be explored.  
4.3 Profit taking?    
      We confirm the finding of the early literature that the abnormal stock returns around 
repurchase announcements are significantly positive. Specifically, the average (median) 
five-day abnormal returns, CAR (-2, 2), are 3% (2%). Therefore, if institutions sell their 
holding immediately after the repurchase announcements, they can reap a quick profit 
upon the price jump. Our finding of institutional sell-off seems to be consistent with this 
profit-taking hypothesis. And this return-contrarian trading might slow down and prolong 
the price adjustment, which contributes to the long-run price drift as documented in the 
prior literature.  
      We further our analysis to see whether institutions sell more following a higher 
abnormal announcement returns. They may do so if their trading is mainly concerned with 
a quick profit taking, especially for those with short investment horizon. From the results in 
Panel C of Table 3, we fail to find such evidence. Active institutions sell more in the 
announcement quarter t in firms of both the high and low terciles of CAR (-2, 2) (and even 
more in firms of the low tercile than in firms of the high tercile) than in firms of the middle 
tercile. Passive institutions at the same time, instead, appear to engage in momentum 
trading. While selling more at low announcement returns, they do not sell at high 
announcement returns. 
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      To more precisely capture institutions’ reaction to the price jump, we narrow down our 
examination window to the days following the repurchase announcements using the daily 
transaction data. Specifically, we examine institutional trading in the eight-day window (3, 
10) when we measure the abnormal returns of the five days (-2, 2) around announcements. 
Results are presented in Panel B of Table 8.  We find that institutions sell significantly more 
following low abnormal returns, while they tend to maintain their holding following high 
abnormal returns. We find similar results if we use the five-day window (6, 10) and 
measure the abnormal returns in the eleven days (-5, 5). Overall, our findings suggest that 
institutions sell their holding beyond profit-taking per se.  
4.4 More institutional trading in firms with greater institutional ownership? 
      The adverse selection theory of Brennan and Thakor (1990) suggests that uninformed 
investors will not tender their shares in firms’ open-market repurchases if informed 
ownership is sufficiently high. This is because the expected loss of tendering is greater than 
the expected gain of tendering for uninformed investors. The intuition is as follows. 
Uninformed investors have to share the gain with informed investors if they tender and 
there is a gain in tendering, because informed investors will tender too. However, if 
uninformed investors tender with a loss, they will have to take the loss alone because 
informed investors will not tender in this case. Assuming that institutions are more 
informed than individuals on average, we should observe that individuals would trade less 
in the repurchases when institutional ownership is higher, so that the decline in 
institutional ownership should be greater. 
      We test this prediction to show that institutions sell more when individuals are likely to 
keep from trading. We measure a firm’s informed ownership using its institutional 
ownership as of one quarter prior to repurchase announcements. As shown in Panel D of 
Table 3, we find that institutional ownership drops significantly more in firms with higher 
prior institutional ownership. For instance, the abnormal change in institutional ownership 
in the repurchase announcement quarter t is -2.7 percent of total shares outstanding for 
firms in the high tercile of institutional ownership as of quarter t-1, and it is highly 
significant. In comparison, despite being statistically indistinguishable from zero, the 
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abnormal change is 0.18 percent for firms in the low tercile.8  The results are robust to the 
institutional trading window.  
      In sum, we find evidence in support of Brennan and Thakor (1990). Institutions sell 
more and individual investors tend to refrain from tendering their shares in open-market 
repurchases when institutional ownership is higher.   
4.5 The impact of arbitrage cost   
           As discussed in the introduction, repurchases can create a wealth transfer between 
tendering and withholding shareholders. Institutions can arbitrage by buying undervalued 
stocks. The small magnitude of institutional sell-off that we have shown earlier suggests 
that there are many institutions buying shares during firms’ repurchases. Given that open-
market repurchases are a noisy signal of firm valuation, arbitrage is costly in general. It is 
even more so when repurchasing firms have more informational uncertainty. On the other 
hand, given the fixed information collection cost, informed investors can obtain greater gain 
in firms with more information asymmetry (Brennan and Thakor, 1990). Therefore, 
institutions face a trade-off between the cost and gain of arbitrage.  In equilibrium, when we 
observe institutions buying stocks of repurchase firms, it suggests that the gain of arbitrage 
outweighs the cost for these institutions. Overall, the following hypothesis holds that 
institutions are less likely to buy shares of repurchasing firms when the informational 
uncertainty of these firms is higher, but when they buy, they would gain from such stock 
purchases.  
      Here we test the first part of this hypothesis by relating institutional trading to firms’ 
informational uncertainty. We leave the test of the second part to the analysis when we 
examine the return predictability of institutional trading later. We use idiosyncratic 
volatility (IV) of repurchasing firms’ stock returns as a proxy for their information 
uncertainty. The results presented in Panel E of Table 3 confirm this conjecture. Institutions, 
especially those active in trading, tend to sell more shares in firms of the high IV tercile. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The results for institutional ownership as of four quarters prior to the announcement are qualitatively 
consistent with the results reported on Panel D of Table 3. They are available upon request.	  	  
20	  
	  
	  
Specifically, the abnormal selling by active institutions in high-IV firms more than doubles 
that in low-IV firms in the repurchase announcement quarter. And this difference appears 
to persist in the two subsequent quarters. Our finding indicates that institutions are less 
likely to buy, or rather sell shares upon firms’ repurchase decisions possibly because of the 
high arbitrage cost arising from the informational uncertainty in those firms.  
4.6 Ill-timed/motivated repurchases 
      Firms may not always decide to repurchase shares because managers believe their 
shares are undervalued. Prior studies have suggested that firms may repurchase to mimic 
their competitors’ repurchase decisions (Massa, Rehman, and Vermaelen, 2007), or to boost 
up the firms’ earnings-per-share towards analysts’ forecast (Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson, 
2006), especially when managers’ own compensation is linked to a target of earnings-per-
share (Cheng, Harford, and Zhang, 2010). Anecdotally, practitioners were concerned with 
repurchases that are insensitive to firms’ intrinsic valuations. For instance, an article by 
Liam Denning (Wall Street Journal, October 6, 2008), also quoted in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Skinner (2008), states that “Warren Buffet knows a value stock when he sees it. Other 
executives can struggle with the concept – particularly when it comes to their own 
company’s shares.”           
      Overall, as discussed in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2008), many firms seem to 
have surrendered their market-timing ability in their repurchase decisions. This is 
especially so for those repurchases made during the market boom before the high-tech 
bubble burst in 2001 and the financial meltdown in 2008.9 Firms that made repurchase 
when they were highly valued, and only observed their stock prices dropped well below 
the repurchasing prices subsequently. It is also likely that these firms exhausted their cash 
holding and failed to build a cash cushion against slowdown in growth during economic 
and financial downturns. Such ill-timed/motivated repurchases clearly benefited the 
selling investors at the expense of loyal (withholding) investors. We thus examine how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Jiang and Koller (2011) find that S&P 500 companies fail to consistently pick the right time to buy back their 
shares at advantageous prices for the years 2004 through 2010. 
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institutions trade upon repurchase announcements during two specific periods – 1998-1999 
and 2006-2007.  
      The findings presented in Panel B of Table 2 show that institutions sold dramatically 
more in 1998-1999 than the sample average while their reactions were more tepid in 2006-
2007. It seems that the subsequent systematic financial market meltdown was unexpected 
even among institutional investors in 2006-2007. Instead, in 1998-1999, institutions either 
disagreed more with the repurchase decisions or might have simply taken advantage of the 
repurchases to exit these firms. During the three quarters (t, t+2), the sell-off of 0.97 percent 
by passive institutions doubled the sample average, while active institutions sold 2.4 
percent of the firms’ shares, a magnitude of five times of the sample average. In comparison, 
the contemporaneous change in institutional ownership in the matched firms was 
insignificantly different from zero.  Our finding echoes the findings by Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2004) and Griffin, Harris, Shu, and Topaloglu (forthcoming) that informed investors 
rode on the high-tech bubble and exited before its burst. Share repurchases by firms 
provided an opportunity for such a profitable exit.  
      Besides the special time periods, we further analyze how institutions may react to ill-
timed/motivated repurchases more generally. Yet, it is difficult to measure, ex ante, how 
well a repurchase decision is timed. We circumvent this empirical challenge by studying 
whether institutions endorse managerial decisions prior to the repurchase announcements 
through their trading activities. The more increase in institutional holding, the more likely 
are institutions to agree with management, which implies a higher firm valuation.10 One 
might argue that institutions may increase their holding when firms are undervalued. But 
the undervaluation should diminish with the increase in institutional ownership. Therefore, 
a firm’s decision to buy back shares would not be as a good timing when institutional 
investors have been buying heavily into the firm’s stock as when they have been fleeing 
away from it. Specifically, we examine how institutions react to repurchases differently in 
firms with different prior institutional trading in the past four quarters.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Alternatively, one may be concerned that institutions increase their holding for the sole purpose of speculation in 
some circumstances. But speculation would also boost up stock prices which diminishes the likelihood of 
undervaluation.  
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      The results are in Panel A of Table 4. In the announcement quarter t, the abnormal 
institutional sell-off is concentrated in firms of high and medium terciles of prior change in 
institutional ownership, with the magnitude of the sell-off being significantly greater in 
firms of the high tercile. We do not observe an abnormal institutional trading in firms of the 
low tercile. The negative relationship between pre-announcement and post-announcement 
institutional trading holds for the longer examination window (t, t+2) and for both active 
and passive institutions. It confirms that, when firms make repurchases that are less desired 
by institutions and thus are more poorly timed, institutions tend to “vote with their feet”. 
We also test this hypothesis in the two special time periods. The results are robust in both 
cases, although more pronounced for the period 1998-1999. In firms of the high tercile of 
prior institutional trading, the abnormal drop in institutional ownership amounts to 6.3 
percent of shares outstanding, most of which is accounted for by active institutions.   
      One possible alternative explanation is that institutions might have been accumulating 
shares in anticipation of the repurchase announcements so that they can profit from selling 
upon the price jump on announcements. However, this arbitrage strategy on a voluntary 
firm decision such as repurchase is risky ex ante. It is unclear whether institutions will take 
this risk at the first hand. Moreover, our finding on institutional trading upon high vs. low 
abnormal returns around repurchase announcements, as shown in both Panel B of Table 3 
and Panel B of Table 8, has suggested that institutions are unlikely to trade to take a quick 
profit. They sell more when the abnormal returns are lower, and do not sell at all upon high 
returns. This finding is rather consistent with institutions being more likely to abandon 
firms, whose repurchase decisions are not so well received by investors, as can be seen by 
the low announcement returns.        
      Lastly, we investigate how remaining shareholders may be fared after poorly 
timed/motivated repurchases. We look at the differences of the cumulative stock returns 
following repurchase announcements between firms of the high tercile and firms of the low 
tercile of pre-announcement change in institutional ownership. As Panel C of Table 4 shows, 
in the subsequent year (quarters t+1 to t+4), firms of the high ercile underperform by 5.27% 
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in stock returns compared to those of the low tercile. This underperformance continues in 
the second year, although it becomes statistically insignificant.  
4.7 Multivariate regression 
      We have shown that institutions sell significantly more in firms with higher 
idiosyncratic volatility (IV), and suggested that institutions refrain from buying into high-
IV firms because of the more daunting arbitrage cost in these firms. It is likely that firms 
with better growth opportunities have higher IV. Therefore, the IV-trading relationship 
might arise from investors’ concern that the cash distributed through repurchases could 
have been better utilized in investing in more positive NPV projects. As such, we need to 
control for growth opportunities in examining the IV-trading relation. Similarly, pre-
announcement institutional trading may be related to certain firm characteristics that 
would also affect the post-announcement institutional trading, such as prior stock returns 
and growth opportunities. To show the robustness of the findings from the above 
univariate analysis, we conduct a multivariate regression of the post-announcement 
institutional trading.  
      We present the regression results in Table 5 for both the overall institutional trading and 
trading by active institutions. And we focus on their trading in the announcement quarter t 
and the three-quarter window (t, t+2). Overall, institutions tend to sell more in the 
announcement quarter in firms with greater increase in pre-announcement institutional 
ownership, higher idiosyncratic volatility, and larger announced program size. Meanwhile, 
they buy more if the firms experience better stock returns prior to the announcements or if 
the announcement returns are higher. Consistent with the univariate analysis, we do not 
find that institutional trading is related to firm size or the book-to-market ratio. The results 
for trading in the three-quarter window are similar, except that the relation of institutional 
trading with IV and the announcement returns becomes insignificant. It suggests that these 
two factors only affect institutions’ short-term trading behavior. Given that trading by 
active institutions accounts for the most of the institutional trading, results for active 
institutions do not change qualitatively.   
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4.8 Informativeness of institutional trading 
      In this section, we investigate whether and to what extent institutional trading is 
informative by examining the relation between institutional trading and the future stock 
returns. While the overall post-repurchase institutional ownership declines, the magnitude 
is relatively small and many firms experience a net inflow of institutional investment. We 
therefore compare the returns of stocks that institutions buy with those they sell. The 
literature has suggested that stock purchases are typically more informative about future 
returns than stock sales. In this regard, we focus on institutional net purchases. 
      Specifically, we rank all sample firms into quintiles based on their abnormal 
institutional trading (overall, passive, and active, respectively) during the announcement 
quarter t. We examine separately the returns for the quintile with the most increase in 
institutional ownership (top increase in IO), and those with the most decrease in 
institutional ownership (top decrease in IO), up to eight quarters following the ranking 
quarter.  For both quintiles, we report the average returns in excess of the market returns 
for the sample firms, as well as those for the matched firms, and the difference between the 
two. We also report the average difference in returns between these two quintile portfolios. 
      The baseline results are shown in Table 6. Firms of the top quintile of change in IO 
significantly outperform their matched counterparties over the following year (quarter t+1 
to t+4), while firms of the bottom quintile of change in IO do not outperform persistently 
during the same time or even underperform. Yet, the return predictability is limited to 
trading by active institutions. Taken together with passive institutions’ smooth trading 
which is in a closer pace with of firm actual buybacks on the open market over time, we 
conclude that trading by passive institutions mostly serves the purpose of liquidity 
provision.  
      The outperformance by firms of the top quintile of change in active IO is observed in 
every quarter of the year and is significant for the first two quarters. The total one-year 
abnormal stock return amounts to 4.6%. In contrast, firms of the bottom quintile of change 
in active IO have experienced significantly negative abnormal stock returns in the first two 
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quarters of the subsequent year, and no significantly positive abnormal returns are 
observed in these firms for next two quarters.  Our findings suggest that institutions, 
typically active ones, are informed in their trading. And they appear to be better informed 
when they buy than when they sell. Their return predictability, however, decays over a 
longer time period. We do not find evidence that stocks purchased by active institutions 
continue to outperform in the second year of the repurchases.  
We further examine the return predictability of institutional trading on stock 
repurchase using the Ancerno transaction-level data. Panel C of Table 8 shows the stock 
returns over a one-year period following 5-day institutional trading upon repurchase 
announcement. During the 3 months following the 5-day trading upon announcement, 
those stocks with the most increase in institutional ownership earn an average return of 
3.84% in excess of the market return, which is 1.78% more than earned by those with the 
most decrease in institutional ownership. The difference is statistically significant at the 
10% level. The return difference becomes smaller for longer horizons, although there is no 
evidence of return reversal over the one-year period. Overall, the results from the 
transaction level data are qualitatively consistent with those from the quarterly trading data.  
      The costs of collecting and processing information are higher in informationally more 
opaque firms. But that is where institutional investors’ advantage in this respect is more 
pronounced. We split the sample into halves based on firms’ market capitalizations, book-
to-market ratios, and prior stock returns. Firms with more information asymmetry are more 
likely to be undervalued, and thus we include prior stock returns as a potential proxy for 
undervaluation. We expect that institutional trading has better return predictability in small, 
growth and poorly-performing firms. Our analysis presented in Table 7 shows just the case. 
Indeed, we do not find evidence of reliable return predictability in large, value and better 
performed firms. The findings suggest that while institutions sell more in firms with poorer 
prior performance, their purchases can better predict future returns when they buy.  
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5. Conclusion 
      In this paper, we document for the first time in the literature how institutional investors 
trade when firms are buying back shares. Using both the quarterly institutional ownership 
data and institutional transaction-level data, we find that aggregate institutional ownership 
declines following repurchase announcements. Institutions provide shares in satisfying 
share demand from repurchasing firms for the market to clear. But the magnitude of overall 
institutional sell-off is small, accounting for 27% of shares actually bought back by firms at 
the same time. We examine several alternative explanations for the institutional sell-off.  
      Institutions appear to trade on momentum as they sell more in firms with poorer recent 
stock returns. But institutions persistently buy into the matched control firms that are 
similarly performed. Also, we do not find evidence indicating that institutions trade only to 
take a quick profit from stock price rise upon repurchase announcement.  Instead, we find 
that higher arbitrage costs appear to be important in explaining why institutions are less 
likely to buy into some stocks. Institutions sell more in firms with higher institutional 
ownership, as individual investors shy away from trading in these firms. Furthermore, we 
find that institutions tend to abandon stocks of firms that have conducted ill-
timed/motivated repurchases. While the average institutional ownership drops, there are 
many firms that experience a net purchase by institutions. There is evidence that 
institutional purchase is more informative of future stock returns tan institutional sell-off. 
But this return predictability only lives up to one year subsequent to repurchase 
announcements.  
      Our study has important implications for firms’ cash payout policy. Unlike dividends, 
share repurchases are often argued as involving a wealth transfer between tendering 
shareholders and withholding shareholders. Our findings suggest that institutions often 
trade not so distinctly from individual investors, and thus are not necessarily always in an 
advantage to exploit individual investors. But in firms with more information asymmetry, 
institutional investors’ informational advantage is more pronounced, and thus their trading 
has welfare implication.    
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Table 1 Summary statistics and pre-buy-back institutional trading 
 
This table reports summary characteristics of buy-back firms and institutional trading on these firms prior to the buy-back announcement. We include only 
open market repurchases with program size greater than 1%. If there're multiple buy-backs announcements during a year, we only include the first one. We 
report institutional trading from four quarters before till the end of the quarter prior to the announcement. For each firm with repurchase announcement, we 
also find a matched firm. The matched firm is traded in the same calendar quarter and has no repurchase announcement within two years before and after the 
announcement quarter. The matched firm has the closest propensity score to the event firm during the event quarter, where the propensity score is determined 
based on the logit regression where the factors are past four quarters institutional holdings, market capitalization and book-to-market ratio as of the previous 
quarter, and prior 12 month returns. In Panel A, we report the sample mean, median, and standard deviation of the market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, 
prior 12 month returns, and institutional percentage holdings for the four quarters prior to the announcement quarter (Q-4 to Q-1), for both the sample and the 
matched firms. We also report the mean of the difference in these characteristics between the sample and the matched firms, and the corresponding t values. In 
panel B, we report the trading patterns for the sample firms, as well as the abnormal trading as the difference in trading between the sample and the matched 
firm. In addition, we report the abnormal trading of the sample firm relative to the average institutional trading for the same quarter (benchmark2). We report 
the trading patterns for all institutions (type0), passive institutions (type1), active institutions (type2) and others (type3).  The sample period is from January 
1985 to Dec 2008.  The reported trading figures are in percentage.  
Panel A: Summary statistics sample firms 
 
matched firms 
 
   sample - matched 
 
mean median stdev 
 
mean median stdev 
 
mean t value 
log of market cap ($million) 5.97 5.82 2.02 
 
5.58 5.59 1.91 
 
0.39 21.27 
book to market ratio 0.66 0.54 0.67 
 
0.67 0.53 0.77 
 
0.00 -0.20 
past 1 year return 0.14 0.04 0.54 
 
0.15 0.07 0.63 
 
-0.01 -0.68 
institutional holding (Q-1) 0.48 0.48 0.28 
 
0.48 0.48 0.31 
 
0.00 -0.84 
institutional holding (Q-2) 0.48 0.47 0.28 0.48 0.47 0.31 0.00 -0.86 
institutional holding (Q-3) 0.47 0.46 0.28  0.47 0.47 0.30  -0.01 -3.73 
institutional holding (Q-4) 0.46 0.45 0.28  0.46 0.45 0.30  0.00 -1.75 
car (-2, +2) 0.03 0.02 0.10 
       program size 0.08 0.06 0.08 
       N 10119       10119           
 Panel B sample firm trading   
abnormal trading  
(relative to matched firm) 
     abnormal trading  
(relative to benchmark2) 
 
type0 type1 type2 type3 
 
type0 type1 type2 type3 
 
type0 type1 type2 type3 
               Trading (Q-4 - Q-1) 2.40 0.44 1.80 0.16 
 
0.13 0.17 0.00 -0.04 
 
1.51 0.44 0.99 0.08 
t-value 20.70 8.90 18.91 6.12 
 
0.80 2.40 0.03 -1.10 
 
13.33 9.05 10.70 2.96 
Trading (Q-1) 0.59 0.10 0.44 0.05 
 
0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.00 
 
0.27 0.11 0.14 0.02 
t-value 6.98 2.46 6.33 2.30  0.07 0.64 -0.29 -0.01  3.38 2.85 2.06 1.11 
Table 2 Institutional trading upon stock buy-back announcement 
This table reports institutional trading pattern on stocks upon repurchase announcement. The repurchase sample selection and the construction of matching 
firms are discussed in Table 1.  We report the average trading for the sample firm, the matched firm, as well as the abnormal trading as the difference in 
trading between the sample and the matched firm. We report the trading patterns for all institutions (type0), passive institutions (type1), active institutions 
(type2) and others (type3).  Panel A reports results for the whole sample period from January 1985 to Dec 2008. Panel B reports five sub-period results: 
1985-1992, 1993-2000, 2001-2008, 1998-1999, and 2006-2007.   Panel C reports the results on tercile sub-sample based on market capitalization (market 
cap) and boo-to-market (bm) rankings. The reported trading figures are in percentage. 
    sample firm trading                matched firm trading   abnormal trading 
  
all type 1 type 2 type 3 
 
all type 1 type 2 type 3 
 
all type 1 type 2 type 3 
Panel A: whole sample 
Trading (Q0) 
 
-0.69 -0.18 -0.53 0.02 
 
0.60 0.05 0.45 0.10 
 
-1.29 -0.23 -0.98 -0.08 
t-value 
 
-7.97 -4.58 -7.32 0.79 
 
6.20 1.17 5.53 3.59 
 
-10.54 -4.08 -9.53 -2.41 
Trading (Q1) 
 
-0.21 -0.19 0.00 -0.03 
 
0.59 0.02 0.51 0.06 
 
-0.80 -0.21 -0.51 -0.08 
t-value 
 
-2.65 -5.30 0.03 -1.43 
 
5.91 0.55 6.20 2.16 
 
-6.64 -3.81 -5.07 -2.70 
Trading (Q2) 
 
-0.05 -0.11 0.04 0.01 
 
0.11 -0.04 0.16 -0.01 
 
-0.16 -0.07 -0.12 0.03 
t-value 
 
-0.67 -3.24 0.66 0.67 
 
1.05 -0.88 1.89 -0.48 
 
-1.30 -1.24 -1.13 0.83 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -0.95 -0.47 -0.48 0.00 
 
1.30 0.03 1.12 0.14 
 
-2.25 -0.51 -1.61 -0.14 
t-value   -8.62 -10.35 -5.22 0.11   8.92 0.58 9.24 4.05   -12.86 -7.06 -10.91 -3.22 
Panel B: Subsample: sub-periods                        
    1985 – 1992 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -0.52 -0.31 -0.41 0.19 
 
1.70 0.05 1.44 0.20 
 
-2.22 -0.36 -1.85 -0.01 
t-value   -2.30 -2.72 -2.25 3.20   6.24 0.36 7.43 2.26   -6.38 -1.95 -7.14 -0.09 
    1993 – 2000 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -1.29 -0.54 -0.74 -0.01 
 
1.51 0.15 1.15 0.20 
 
-2.80 -0.69 -1.89 -0.21 
t-value   -8.02 -7.90 -5.46 -0.20   6.91 1.80 6.26 4.02   -10.86 -6.43 -8.68 -3.56 
    2001 – 2008 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -0.67 -0.46 -0.12 -0.09 
 
0.75 -0.17 0.90 0.02 
 
-1.42 -0.29 -1.03 -0.10 
t-value   -3.35 -6.52 -0.73 -1.46   2.92 -2.00 4.09 0.30   -4.53 -2.79 -3.79 -1.27 
    1998 – 1999 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -3.37 -0.97 -2.43 0.04 
 
0.02 -0.12 -0.24 0.37 
 
-3.39 -0.86 -2.20 -0.33 
t-value   -10.96 -8.40 -9.62 0.63   0.04 -0.79 -0.71 3.46   -7.18 -4.62 -5.48 -2.75 
    2006 – 2007 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -1.11 -0.74 -0.11 -0.26 
 
0.64 -0.34 1.17 -0.19 
 
-1.76 -0.41 -1.28 -0.07 
t-value   -2.89 -5.29 -0.34 -2.34   1.47 -2.14 3.04 -1.46   -3.14 -2.00 -2.59 -0.40 	  
Table	  2:	  Continued	  
Panel C: market capitalization (market cap) and book-to-market (bm) subsamples  
      sample firm trading  matched firm trading  abnormal trading 
   
all type 1 type 2 type 3 
 
all type 1 type 2 type 3 
 
all type 1 type 2 type 3 
market cap 
 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -0.52 -0.2 -0.35 0.02 
 
1.61 0.33 1.14 0.14 
 
-2.13 -0.53 -1.48 -0.12 
Low   t-value -3.12 -2.85 -2.41 0.62   7.07 4.01 5.87 2.59   -7.77 -4.94 -6.34 -1.82 
Market cap 
 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -1.12 -0.57 -0.55 0 
 
1.76 -0.03 1.61 0.18 
 
-2.88 -0.54 -2.16 -0.18 
Medium   t-value -5.24 -6.94 -2.98 0.08   7.05 -0.33 7.66 2.73   -9.18 -4.4 -8.05 -2.07 
market cap  
 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -1.22 -0.65 -0.55 -0.02 
 
0.52 -0.2 0.62 0.11 
 
-1.74 -0.45 -1.17 -0.12 
high   t-value -6.38 -7.66 -3.69 -0.39   1.9 -1.76 2.74 1.71   -5.45 -3.18 -4.5 -1.68 
                 
bm 
 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -1.29 -0.63 -0.74 0.09 
 
0.99 -0.16 1.04 0.11 
 
-2.28 -0.48 -1.78 -0.03 
Low   t-value -5.88 -7.57 -4.05 1.94   3.75 -1.62 4.62 1.91   -6.83 -3.78 -6.32 -0.38 
bm 
 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -0.41 -0.32 -0.10 0.01 
 
1.63 0.10 1.42 0.12 
 
-2.04 -0.42 -1.51 -0.11 
Medium   t-value -2.30 -4.24 -0.65 0.23   6.39 0.93 6.71 2.08   -6.92 -3.28 -6.15 -1.50 
bm  
 
Trading (Q0 - Q2) -1.17 -0.46 -0.61 -0.09 
 
1.27 0.16 0.91 0.20 
 
-2.44 -0.62 -1.53 -0.29 
high   t-value -6.63 -5.96 -4.18 -1.72   5.41 1.70 4.70 2.93   -8.73 -5.22 -6.51 -3.41 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Table 3: Institutional trading upon stock buy-back announcement: various hypotheses 
This table reports institutional trading upon repurchase announcement for stocks with various firm 
characteristics, based on a number of hypotheses that might explain the trading patterns. The repurchase 
sample selection and the construction of matching firms are discussed in Table 1.  Each sample firm is 
assigned into one of the three terciles (low/medium/high) based on its ranking during the announcement year 
of the average value of a certain firm characteristic for the past four quarters. For each firm characteristic 
ranked tercile, we then calculate the abnormal institutional trading as the difference in trading between the 
sample and the matched firm, from the announcement quarter until two quarters following the announcement. 
We then report the average abnormal trading across terciles and time. We consider the following firm 
characteristics: buy-back program size as percentage of the firm's market capitalization (program size), stock 
turnover in excess of the average stock turnover for the exchange where the sample stock is traded (xto), prior-
6 month returns, the cumulative abnormal returns from two days before until two days after the announcement 
(CAR (-2, +2)), institutional ownership at the end of the quarter prior to the announcement quarter (Q-1), and 
idiosyncratic volatility (iv).  All results are reported in five panels, each representing a different hypothesis, as 
indicated by the panel titles. We report trading by all institutions (all) and by type1 and type2 institutions. We 
report both the average raw trading (Raw Trading) and the abnormal trading (Abn. Trading) as defined in 
Table 2. The sample period is from January 1985 to December 2008. The trading figures are in percentage. 
firm characteristic ranking  Low Medium High 
	   	  
all type1 type2 all type1 type2 all type1 type2 
Panel A	  : Share supply?  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
program Raw Trading(Q0) -0.12 -0.06 -0.12 -0.65 -0.20 -0.51 -1.29 -0.27 -0.95 
size	   t-value -0.92 -1.07 -1.08 -4.31 -2.95 -4.11 -7.95 -3.64 -6.93 
	  
Raw Trading (Q0-Q2) 0.08 -0.19 0.20 -0.86 -0.50 -0.37 -2.07 -0.73 -1.28 
 t-value 0.43 -2.50 1.40 -4.52 -6.41 -2.29 -9.99 -8.82 -7.28 
           
 Abn. Trading(Q0) -0.79 -0.01 -0.7 -1.26 -0.31 -0.94 -1.82 -0.35 -1.3 
	  
t-value -3.89 -0.11 -4.16 -6.03 -3.31 -5.48 -8.16 -3.6 -6.73 
	  
Abn. Trading (Q0-Q2) -1.36 -0.21 -1.06 -2.28 -0.6 -1.54 -3.12 -0.7 -2.22 
  t-value -4.59 -1.72 -4.28 -7.7 -4.6 -6.34 -9.84 -6 -8.13 
	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
xto Raw Trading(Q0) -0.24 -0.13 -0.13 -0.57 -0.20 -0.31 -1.28 -0.21 -1.17 
	  
t-value -1.92 -1.75 -1.34 -3.92 -3.27 -2.57 -7.37 -3.07 -7.74 
	  
Raw Trading (Q0-Q2) -0.26 -0.17 -0.15 -0.80 -0.52 -0.16 -1.82 -0.73 -1.17 
 t-value -1.84 -2.16 -1.30 -4.48 -7.08 -1.07 -7.65 -8.52 -5.74 
           
 Abn. Trading(Q0) -0.75 -0.1 -0.61 -1.33 -0.28 -0.9 -1.81 -0.3 -1.45 
	  
t-value -4.01 -0.99 -4.06 -6.19 -3.01 -4.98 -7.87 -3.24 -7.27 
	  
Abn. Trading (Q0-Q2) -1.66 -0.3 -1.25 -2.41 -0.54 -1.58 -2.72 -0.68 -2.01 
  t-value -6.5 -2.5 -5.99 -7.84 -4.42 -6.13 -7.97 -5.24 -6.91 
Panel B: Momentum trading?                   
prior  Raw Trading(Q0) -1.15 -0.39 -0.76 -0.23 -0.07 -0.22 -0.68 -0.08 -0.61 
6-month t-value -7.60 -6.23 -5.87 -1.58 -0.92 -1.84 -4.54 -1.15 -4.86 
return	   Raw Trading (Q0-Q2) -1.46 -0.80 -0.60 -0.67 -0.42 -0.25 -0.73 -0.20 -0.60 
 t-value -7.67 -10.75 -3.63 -3.83 -5.33 -1.75 -3.52 -2.41 -3.50 
           
 Abn. Trading(Q0) -1.83 -0.37 -1.34 -0.83 -0.16 -0.61 -1.2 -0.14 -0.99 
 t-value -8.53 -3.92 -7.39 -4.05 -1.6 -3.55 -5.61 -1.59 -5.49 
	  
Abn. Trading (Q0-Q2) -3.02 -0.82 -2.01 -1.96 -0.51 -1.28 -1.77 -0.18 -1.53 
  t-value -10.04 -6.92 -7.82 -6.54 -3.88 -5.16 -5.74 -1.51 -5.89 
 
 
Table 3: (continued) 
firm characteristic ranking  Low Medium High 
	   	  
all type1 type2 all type1 type2 all type1 type2 
Panel C: profit taking?  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
CAR  Raw Trading(Q0) -1.04 -0.26 -0.80 -0.34 -0.09 -0.24 -0.71 -0.19 -0.55 
(-2, +2) t-value -6.65 -3.60 -6.20 -2.56 -1.52 -2.19 -4.54 -2.88 -4.16 
 
Raw Trading (Q0-Q2) -1.31 -0.60 -0.72 -0.60 -0.33 -0.25 -0.98 -0.50 -0.49 
 t-value -6.40 -7.53 -4.22 -3.63 -4.45 -1.78 -4.87 -6.08 -2.94 
           
 Abn. Trading(Q0) -1.71 -0.37 -1.19 -1.05 -0.19 -0.82 -1.13 -0.13 -0.94 
 
t-value -7.97 -3.89 -6.54 -5.19 -1.94 -4.88 -5.2 -1.4 -5.11 
 
Abn. Trading (Q0-Q2) -2.5 -0.64 -1.68 -1.91 -0.35 -1.35 -2.38 -0.54 -1.8 
 t-value -7.93 -5.45 -6.26 -6.59 -2.67 -5.65 -7.81 -4.39 -7.03 
Panel D: institutional ownership?  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Past  Raw Trading(Q0) 0.73 0.21 0.48 -0.26 -0.09 -0.19 -2.54 -0.65 -1.87 
holding  t-value 6.19 4.55 4.92 -1.92 -1.64 -1.65 -13.84 -7.10 -12.19 
(Q-1) Raw Trading (Q0-Q2) 1.30 0.24 0.95 -0.45 -0.38 -0.11 -3.71 -1.27 -2.28 
 t-value 8.58 4.51 7.77 -2.44 -5.45 -0.73 -16.61 -12.24 -12.03 
           
 Abn. Trading(Q0) 0.18 0.12 0.07 -1.33 -0.26 -0.98 -2.71 -0.53 -2.03 
 t-value 1 1.65 0.46 -6.59 -2.62 -5.77 -10.99 -4.73 -9.76 
 
Abn. Trading (Q0-Q2) -0.57 0 -0.53 -2.12 -0.57 -1.53 -4.07 -0.96 -2.76 
 t-value -2.19 0.05 -2.46 -7.1 -4.66 -6.01 -11.87 -6.35 -9.58 
Panel E: Arbitrage cost?                                                                                 
iv  Raw Trading(Q0) -0.45 -0.20 -0.26 -0.74 -0.20 -0.55 -0.98 -0.15 -0.84 
 
t-value -3.16 -2.65 -2.46 -5.00 -3.13 -4.38 -6.04 -2.31 -5.89 
 
Raw Trading (Q0-Q2) -0.83 -0.44 -0.30 -1.22 -0.50 -0.72 -1.01 -0.51 -0.54 
 t-value -5.01 -5.17 -2.42 -6.38 -6.50 -4.46 -4.66 -6.60 -2.84 
           
 Abn. Trading(Q0) -0.81 -0.16 -0.6 -1.46 -0.31 -0.99 -1.65 -0.22 -1.39 
 
t-value -3.87 -1.47 -3.58 -6.9 -3.18 -5.54 -7.49 -2.61 -7.3 
 
Abn. Trading (Q0-Q2) -1.86 -0.39 -1.19 -2.24 -0.5 -1.65 -2.74 -0.65 -2.06 
 t-value -6.47 -2.81 -5.14 -7.24 -4.03 -6.36 -8.59 -5.84 -7.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Institutional trading upon stock buy-back announcement: conditional on pre-announcement trading 
This table reports institutional trading upon repurchase announcement, conditional on pre-announcement trading. The repurchase sample selection and the 
construction of matching firms are discussed in Table 1. Each sample firm is assigned into one of the three terciles (low/medium/high) based on its cross-
sectional ranking during the announcement year of the trading (Q-4 - Q-1). Panel A reports the average trading across terciles and time. We report trading by 
all institutions (all) and by type1 and type2 institutions. We report both the average raw trading (Raw Trading) and the abnormal trading (Abn. Trading) as 
defined in Table 2. Panel B reports the results for the period of 1998-1999 and 2006-2007. In Panel C, each sample firm is assigned into one of the five 
quintiles based on its cross-sectional ranking during the announcement year of the trading (Q-4 - Q-1). For each quintile, we record the post-announcement 
stock return, from one quarter after the buy-back announcement until eight quarters after. We report the average future returns and t values for the quintile 
with the lowest (Low) and the highest (High) ranking in pre-announcement trading (Low), and the differences in future returns between these two quintiles 
(High - Low). The sample period is from January 1985 to December 2008. The reported trading and return figures are in percentage. 
Panel A: Prior institutional trading (Q-4 - Q-1): Whole sample                 
	  
Low  Medium  High 
	  
all type1 type2  all type1 type2  all type1 type2 
            Raw Trading (Q0) 1.20 0.11 0.99  -0.32 -0.15 -0.18  -2.95 -0.49 -2.40 t-value 8.41 1.83 8.46  -3.07 -3.19 -2.08  -16.13 -5.75 -15.58 Raw Trading (Q1) -0.86 -0.30 -0.50  -0.20 -0.19 0.00  0.44 -0.07 0.51 t-value -6.39 -5.02 -4.41  -1.83 -3.60 -0.03  2.69 -1.00 3.79 Raw Trading (Q2) 0.16 -0.05 0.22  -0.05 -0.13 0.08  -0.27 -0.15 -0.16 t-value 1.17 -0.94 1.84  -0.45 -2.29 0.82  -1.74 -2.33 -1.23 Raw Trading (Q0 - Q2) 0.50 -0.24 0.71  -0.58 -0.46 -0.11  -2.78 -0.72 -2.06 t-value 2.63 -3.18 4.55   -4.00 -7.29 -0.88   -12.24 -7.53 -10.69 
            Abn. Trading (Q0) 0.04 -0.07 0.12  -0.82 -0.15 -0.59  -3.08 -0.45 -2.47 t-value 0.17 -0.84 0.68  -4.31 -1.65 -3.81  -13.04 -4.26 -12.29 Abn. Trading (Q1) -1.06 -0.27 -0.66  -0.99 -0.3 -0.61  -0.36 -0.06 -0.26 t-value -5.08 -2.74 -3.68  -5.08 -3.35 -3.8  -1.6 -0.63 -1.42 Abn.Trading (Q2) 0.01 0.16 -0.17  -0.16 -0.14 -0.04  -0.34 -0.23 -0.14 t-value 0.06 1.54 -0.94  -0.81 -1.58 -0.25  -1.48 -2.22 -0.72 Abn. Trading (Q0 - Q2) -1.01 -0.19 -0.71  -1.97 -0.59 -1.24  -3.78 -0.74 -2.87 t-value -3.41 -1.58 -2.83   -7.22 -5.23 -5.37   -11.25 -5.29 -10.3 
 
 
 
Table 4: (continued) 
Panel B: Prior institutional trading (Q-4 - Q-1): Subsample periods             
	  
Low  Medium  High 
	  
all type1 type2  all type1 type2  all type1 type2 
1998 - 1999                       
Raw Trading (Q0 - Q2) -0.24 -0.55 0.46   -2.76 -1.00 -1.79   -7.10 -1.37 -5.96 
t-value -0.45 -3.10 1.06   -6.43 -6.27 -5.01   -12.16 -5.45 -12.50 
            Abn. Trading (Q0 - Q2) -1.29 -0.6 -0.27  -2.58 -0.88 -1.27  -6.29 -1.09 -5.05 t-value -1.68 -2.49 -0.39   -3.52 -2.79 -1.99   -6.78 -2.8 -6.8 
2006 - 2007                       
Raw Trading (Q0 - Q2) -1.49 -0.73 -0.49   -0.22 -0.62 0.67   -1.17 -0.22 -0.99 
t-value -1.86 -2.78 -0.74   -0.63 -3.68 1.93   -1.54 -0.76 -1.39 
            Abn. Trading (Q0 - Q2) -1.39 -0.16 -1.32  -1.17 -0.22 -0.99  -2.7 -0.84 -1.52 t-value -1.34 -0.43 -1.48   -1.54 -0.76 -1.39   -2.55 -2.25 -1.62 
Panel C: Prior abnormal trading (Q-4 -1) and future returns 
  Q1   Q2  Q1-4  Q5-8 
	  
Low High High - Low  Low High High - Low  Low High High - Low  Low High High - Low 
	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
return  4.78 3.15 -1.62 
	  
4.61 3.21 -1.4 
	  
18.27 13 -5.27 
	  
15.18 13.28 -1.9 
t value 4.03 2.3 -2.26   3.71 2.72 -1.54   6.96 5.03 -2.76   5.78 5.5 -0.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 institutional trading upon buy-back announcement: multivariate regressions 
This table reports results from regression analysis of institutional abnormal trading (relative to benchmark as defined in Table 2) upon buy-back 
announcement and a number of firm characteristics. The repurchase sample selection and the construction of matching firms are discussed in Table 1. We 
include the following firm characteristics: the trading of all institutions from Q-4 to Q-1 (Prior trading  (Q-4 - Q-1)), and program size, CAR (-2, +2), bm, 
market cap, prior 6 month returns, IV, xto, and analyst coverage, as defined in Table 3. Each of these characteristics takes a value 0, 1, or 2 based on the 
sample firm's tercile ranking on each characteristic during the announcement year. We then regress the post-announcement abnormal trading (Q0, and (Q0 - 
Q2)) on these ranked characteristics across all sample firms and time. Panel A report the regression results where the dependent variable is the trading by all 
institutions.  Panel B reports results where the dependent variable is the trading by type 2 institutions. The sample is from January 1985 to December 2008. 
Dependent variable  
    Intercept 
Prior 
trading 
Program 
size CAR bm 
Market 
cap 
Prior 6- 
month 
return IV xto Analyst 
 
Adj
R2 
        (Q-4 - Q-1) 
 
(-2, +2) 
     
coverage 
  Panel A:  
              Trading Q0 parameter 0.0106 -0.0160 -0.0067 0.0046 0.0006 -0.0011 0.0054 -0.0061 -0.0010 -0.0041 
 
0.02 
(all) 
 
t value 1.65 -9.15 -3.68 2.54 0.31 -0.35 2.95 -2.63 -0.46 -1.61 
  
               
 
Q0 - Q2 parameter -0.0042 -0.0143 -0.0100 0.0038 0.0008 0.0027 0.0081 -0.0019 -0.0056 -0.0013 
 
0.01 
  
t value -0.45 -5.70 -3.81 1.46 0.26 0.61 3.09 -0.56 -1.78 -0.35 
  
               Panel B:  
              Trading Q0 parameter 0.0074 -0.0130 -0.0036 0.0027 0.0015 -0.0008 0.0037 -0.0055 -0.0010 -0.0023 
 
0.01 
(type 2) 
 
t value 1.39 -8.95 -2.36 1.79 0.88 -0.30 2.42 -2.85 -0.56 -1.09 
  
               
 
Q0 - Q2 parameter -0.0010 -0.0112 -0.0067 0.0024 0.0025 -0.0003 0.0039 -0.0024 -0.0039 0.0018 
 
0.01 
    t value -0.13 -5.34 -3.08 1.09 1.06 -0.08 1.77 -0.88 -1.48 0.60   
  
 
 
 
Table 6: returns of buy-back firms following institutional trading 
This table reports returns on stocks following institutional trading on buy-back announcement. The repurchase sample selection and the construction of 
matching firms are discussed in Table 1.  Every quarter we rank all buy-back firms into quintiles based on their institutional trading during the 
announcement quarter. We examine separately the returns for the quintile with the most increase in institutional ownership (top increase in IO), and those 
with the most decrease in institutional ownership (top decrease in IO), up to 8 quarters following the ranking quarter.  For both quintiles, we report the 
average return in excess of the market return for the sample firms, as well as those for the matched firms, as well as the difference between the two. We 
also report the average difference in excess returns between these two quintile portfolios. Panel A reports the results for all institutions. Panel B through 
D report results for passive institutions (type 1), and active institutions (type 2), respectively.  The sample period is from January 1985 to December 2008. 
The returns are in percentage. 
    Top Increase in IO   Top decrease in IO   Inc - Dec  
    sample matched Diff   sample matched Diff   (sample) 
Panel A: all institutions 
         Quarter 1 return 4.48 3.89 0.59 
 
4.60 3.61 0.99   -0.12 
 
t-value 3.78 2.79 0.66 
 
3.54 2.53 1.01 
 
-0.13 
Quarter 2 return 4.60 2.89 1.70   2.55 4.13 -1.58   2.05 
 
t-value 4.21 2.14 2.01 
 
2.28 3.14 -1.99 
 
2.68 
Quarters 3 - 4 return 8.82 6.81 2.12   9.41 6.36 3.26   -0.58 
 
t-value 4.85 3.43 1.63 
 
4.81 3.30 2.68 
 
-0.52 
Quarters 5 - 8 return 14.45 14.15 -0.52 
 
14.39 16.24 -1.18 
 
0.06 
 
t-value 5.92 4.62 -0.21 
 
5.96 4.76 -0.50 
 
0.04 
Panel B: type1 institutions     
 
      
 
  
Quarter 1 return 3.47 2.68 0.80 
 
4.77 2.58 2.19   -1.30 
 
t-value 2.80 1.93 0.98 
 
4.32 2.07 3.26 
 
-1.80 
Quarter 2 return 3.97 3.72 0.25   3.22 4.45 -1.23   0.75 
 
t-value 3.59 2.89 0.31 
 
3.02 3.49 -1.68 
 
1.08 
Quarters 3 - 4 return 7.84 5.99 1.90   9.49 9.51 -0.06   -1.65 
 
t-value 4.48 3.11 1.57 
 
4.83 4.18 -0.04 
 
-1.43 
Quarter 5 - 8 return 15.64 20.83 -5.46 
 
14.09 15.45 -1.37 
 
1.55 
 
t-value 6.43 3.94 -1.08 
 
6.41 5.32 -0.61 
 
0.87 
           
 
 
Table 6 (continued) 
    Top Increase in IO   Top decrease in IO   Inc - Dec  
    sample matched Diff   sample matched Diff   (sample) 
           
Panel C: type 2 
institutions         
 
      
 
  
Quarter 1 return 4.50 3.00 1.49 
 
4.21 3.72 0.48   0.29 
 
t-value 3.98 2.21 1.80 
 
3.01 2.66 0.43 
 
0.31 
Quarter 2 return 4.41 2.68 1.74   1.98 3.59 -1.62   2.44 
 
t-value 3.79 1.93 2.08 
 
1.71 2.53 -2.12 
 
3.50 
Quarters 3 - 4 return 8.00 6.68 1.40   8.88 7.26 1.62   -0.88 
 
t-value 4.53 3.02 1.03 
 
4.63 3.56 1.31 
 
-0.86 
Quarters 5 - 8 return 13.96 13.29 0.37 
 
14.81 16.75 -1.32 
 
-0.86 
 
t-value 5.79 4.62 0.16 
 
6.31 4.73 -0.56 
 
-0.53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: returns on buy-back firms following institutional trading conditional on firm characteristics 
This table reports returns on stocks following institutional trading on buy-back announcement. The repurchase sample selection and the construction of 
matching firms are discussed in Table 1.We split the sample into halves based on the sample firms' ranking of various firm characteristics during the 
announcement year. Within each half sample, we rank all buy-back firms into quintiles based on their abnormal institutional trading during the 
announcement quarter. We examine separately the returns for the quintile with the most increase in institutional ownership (top increase in IO), and those 
with the most decrease in institutional ownership (top decrease in IO), up to 8 quarters following the ranking quarter.  For both quintiles, we report the 
average excess returns for the sample firms, as well as the difference between the sample firm and the matched firm (as defined in Table 3). We report the 
results for all institutions, passive institutions (type 1), and active institutions (type 2), respectively. We report results for the following firm characteristics as 
defined in Table 3: market cap, bm, prior six-month return, and iv. The sample period is from January 1985 to December 2008. The returns are in percentage.  
    All institutions 
 
Type 1 institutions 
 
Type 2 institutions 
    
Top increase in 
IO 
Top decrease in 
IO 
Inc - 
Dec 
 
Top increase in 
IO 
Top decrease in 
IO 
Inc - 
Dec 
 
Top increase in 
IO 
Top decrease in 
IO 
Inc - 
Dec 
    sample diff Sample diff (sample) 
 
sample diff Sample diff (sample) 
 
sample diff Sample diff (sample) 
Panel A1: market capitalization (large)                             
Q1 return 2.70 -0.96 5.17 2.50 -2.46 
 
2.72 0.70 4.54 2.31 -1.82 
 
3.57 0.78 5.09 2.07 -1.53 
 
t-value 2.33 -0.87 3.71 2.22 -2.18 
 
2.09 0.69 4.31 2.53 -1.88 
 
3.10 0.69 3.33 1.65 -1.29 
Q2 return 3.96 0.16 3.93 -0.54 0.03 
 
4.06 -0.13 4.67 -0.18 -0.60 
 
3.67 -0.76 3.31 -1.29 0.36 
 
t-value 3.67 0.13 3.34 -0.53 0.04 
 
3.54 -0.12 4.34 -0.17 -0.66 
 
3.15 -0.56 2.73 -1.16 0.39 
Q3-4 return 9.46 2.19 9.30 4.13 0.16 
 
7.24 0.28 8.07 1.91 -0.83 
 
9.21 2.58 8.92 1.22 0.29 
 
t-value 5.38 1.69 4.88 3.02 0.11 
 
4.22 0.19 4.28 1.41 -0.62 
 
5.11 1.65 4.73 0.65 0.19 
Q5-8 return 15.10 0.37 15.08 -3.74 0.09 
 
16.70 -1.83 12.37 -3.66 4.33 
 
14.36 1.47 16.80 -1.64 -2.44 
  t-value 5.69 0.15 6.50 -1.06 0.04   6.57 -0.64 5.45 -1.25 1.79   5.69 0.53 6.94 -0.49 -1.16 
Panel A2: market capitalization (small)                             
Q1 return 6.19 2.32 4.25 -0.33 1.93 
 
4.40 -1.75 4.67 0.92 -0.26 
 
5.63 1.26 3.36 -2.08 2.27 
 
t-value 4.13 1.63 2.80 -0.23 1.35 
 
3.12 -1.28 3.13 0.74 -0.19 
 
3.92 0.98 2.31 -1.34 1.77 
Q2 return 6.22 4.95 1.48 -2.28 4.74 
 
5.07 0.51 2.28 -3.30 2.79 
 
5.34 3.95 1.82 -1.29 3.52 
 
t-value 4.31 3.99 1.16 -1.96 4.04 
 
3.86 0.40 1.62 -2.48 2.30 
 
3.80 3.06 1.42 -1.12 3.21 
Q3-4 return 7.42 3.06 10.44 2.78 -3.02 
 
7.16 3.83 10.75 -2.60 -3.59 
 
7.72 -1.37 9.42 1.60 -1.70 
 
t-value 3.41 1.35 4.21 1.41 -1.77 
 
3.31 2.14 4.45 -0.79 -1.90 
 
3.78 -0.40 3.77 0.78 -0.97 
Q5-8 return 15.41 0.37 13.60 -0.11 1.97 
 
14.05 -8.38 15.74 1.57 -1.77 
 
14.45 -0.76 14.07 0.59 0.73 
 
t-value 4.79 0.08 4.41 -0.03 0.65 
 
5.22 -0.93 4.51 0.47 -0.52 
 
4.45 -0.18 4.80 0.17 0.27 
Table 7: Continued 
    All institutions 
 
Type 1 institutions 
 
Type 2 institutions 
    
Top increase in 
IO 
Top decrease in 
IO 
Inc - 
Dec 
 
Top increase in 
IO 
Top decrease in 
IO 
Inc - 
Dec 
 
Top increase in 
IO 
Top decrease in 
IO 
Inc - 
Dec 
    sample diff Sample diff (sample) 
 
sample diff Sample diff (sample) 
 
sample diff Sample diff (sample) 
Panel B1: bm (high)                             
Q1 return 6.10 1.78 5.62 0.98 0.48 
 
5.84 2.27 5.13 2.82 0.71 
 
5.33 2.27 4.97 0.78 0.36 
 
t-value 4.66 1.47 3.75 0.77 0.40 
 
4.18 1.99 3.74 2.85 0.64 
 
4.34 2.13 3.34 0.56 0.29 
Q2 return 4.01 1.67 2.73 -1.35 1.28 
 
3.01 -0.06 3.76 -0.50 -0.76 
 
4.50 2.22 1.98 -0.73 2.52 
 
t-value 3.43 1.62 2.53 -1.46 1.33 
 
2.77 -0.06 3.27 -0.50 -0.96 
 
3.62 2.24 1.94 -0.74 2.79 
Q3-4 return 8.61 1.79 9.16 1.96 -0.55 
 
7.33 2.05 9.89 -0.48 -2.56 
 
8.22 -0.24 7.95 0.34 0.27 
 
t-value 4.34 1.11 4.29 1.09 -0.41 
 
3.68 1.29 4.49 -0.23 -1.68 
 
3.93 -0.10 3.69 0.18 0.17 
Q5-8 return 14.90 1.11 14.05 -3.14 0.85 
 
15.17 -2.07 14.95 -2.68 0.22 
 
14.41 -0.18 15.04 0.51 -0.63 
  t-value 5.39 0.35 4.88 -1.11 0.35  5.15 -0.55 5.50 -1.08 0.09  5.24 -0.06 5.04 0.15 -0.24 
Panel B2: bm (low)                             
Q1 return 2.64 -0.93 4.11 1.48 -1.48 
 
0.78 -1.61 4.30 1.82 -3.53 
 
3.71 -0.11 3.79 1.27 -0.08 
 
t-value 2.05 -0.64 2.74 1.27 -1.18 
 
0.56 -1.32 3.98 1.67 -3.84 
 
2.83 -0.08 2.36 1.01 -0.06 
Q2 return 4.68 1.98 2.87 -2.03 1.81 
 
5.66 1.46 2.95 -1.99 2.71 
 
3.31 0.69 2.86 -1.84 0.45 
 
t-value 3.28 1.38 2.12 -1.51 1.31 
 
3.91 1.14 2.43 -1.56 1.97 
 
2.61 0.48 2.12 -1.41 0.38 
Q3-4 return 7.55 1.23 8.66 4.37 -1.10 
 
5.71 -0.80 8.97 1.34 -3.25 
 
8.23 2.04 8.50 2.08 -0.26 
 
t-value 3.75 0.49 3.76 2.17 -0.54 
 
2.98 -0.42 3.88 0.77 -1.55 
 
4.03 0.95 3.79 0.91 -0.13 
Q5-8 return 11.62 0.65 15.06 2.50 -3.44 
 
12.42 -11.1 12.84 -0.78 -0.42 
 
10.69 0.85 16.15 2.93 -5.46 
 
t-value 3.79 0.19 5.89 0.71 -1.26 
 
4.34 -1.26 5.01 -0.24 -0.14 
 
3.24 0.28 6.02 0.75 -1.85 
Panel C1: prior six-month return (high)                             
Q1 return 3.97 0.25 4.89 1.16 -0.93 
 
3.67 0.45 5.49 3.33 -1.82 
 
4.30 1.49 4.51 0.81 -0.21 
 
t-value 3.27 0.21 3.94 0.94 -0.80 
 
2.99 0.36 4.79 3.15 -1.79 
 
3.84 1.25 3.25 0.64 -0.18 
Q2 return 3.49 -0.84 3.50 -0.87 -0.01 
 
3.90 -0.03 3.12 -2.37 0.78 
 
3.83 -0.36 2.07 -1.36 1.76 
 
t-value 2.97 -0.54 3.03 -0.71 -0.01 
 
3.38 -0.02 2.80 -1.86 0.89 
 
3.32 -0.28 1.81 -1.49 2.03 
Q3-4 return 7.14 1.80 10.28 3.52 -3.14 
 
7.10 1.80 9.95 -1.22 -2.85 
 
7.20 -0.58 9.62 1.21 -2.43 
 
t-value 3.49 1.10 5.17 2.40 -2.00 
 
3.91 1.03 4.96 -0.52 -1.77 
 
4.01 -0.27 4.64 0.61 -1.50 
Q5-8 return 15.36 2.50 13.80 -1.78 1.68 
 
16.40 -9.31 11.87 -3.05 4.67 
 
13.56 -0.35 14.49 -0.75 -0.71 
 
t-value 5.35 0.67 5.01 -0.51 0.62   6.15 -1.22 4.98 -1.16 1.83   5.22 -0.10 5.05 -0.22 -0.26 
Table 7: continued 
    All institutions 
 
Type 1 institutions 
 
Type 2 institutions 
    
Top increase in 
IO 
Top decrease in 
IO 
Inc - 
Dec 
 
Top increase in 
IO 
Top decrease in 
IO 
Inc - 
Dec 
 
Top increase in 
IO 
Top decrease in 
IO 
Inc - 
Dec 
    sample diff Sample diff (sample) 
 
sample diff Sample diff (sample) 
 
sample diff Sample diff (sample) 
Panel C2:  prior six-month return (low)                             
Q1 return 5.07 0.71 4.28 0.63 0.82 
 
3.62 0.10 4.76 1.97 -1.12 
 
5.89 0.76 3.58 0.17 2.46 
 
t-value 3.22 0.48 2.33 0.46 0.55 
 
2.34 0.06 3.37 1.56 -0.88 
 
3.59 0.33 1.92 0.12 1.63 
Q2 return 4.98 3.65 1.72 -2.86 3.04 
 
4.28 2.09 3.14 0.32 0.91 
 
5.12 5.19 1.54 -2.78 3.66 
 
t-value 3.37 2.88 1.16 -2.06 2.14 
 
2.98 1.38 2.20 0.25 0.68 
 
3.27 3.89 1.06 -2.14 2.42 
Q3-4 return 10.66 4.03 9.64 4.69 1.12 
 
7.48 2.67 10.98 2.95 -3.43 
 
10.61 5.34 7.97 2.27 2.14 
 
t-value 4.71 2.09 3.61 2.02 0.56 
 
3.65 1.21 3.84 1.28 -1.73 
 
4.29 2.25 3.02 0.98 1.01 
Q5-8 return 13.64 2.92 17.04 -2.71 -2.95 
 
15.77 -2.35 17.05 0.90 -0.61 
 
13.33 2.64 16.02 -1.88 -2.03 
  t-value 3.88 0.85 5.07 -0.83 -0.79   5.17 -0.44 5.40 0.27 -0.18   4.03 0.68 5.73 -0.55 -0.71 
Panel D1: iv (high)                             
Q1 return 4.65 1.22 3.28 -0.64 1.37 
 
2.09 -0.95 4.85 2.83 -2.76 
 
4.05 1.45 2.51 -2.80 1.54 
 
t-value 2.96 0.87 1.94 -0.49 1.11 
 
1.33 -0.77 3.12 2.30 -2.48 
 
2.62 1.11 1.43 -2.33 1.11 
Q2 return 4.15 1.96 2.62 -0.52 1.54 
 
5.57 1.30 2.20 -1.77 3.37 
 
3.36 2.02 2.63 -0.10 0.73 
 
t-value 2.72 1.50 1.66 -0.43 1.20 
 
3.71 0.97 1.39 -1.30 2.81 
 
2.17 1.48 1.80 -0.10 0.58 
Q3-4 return 8.67 2.79 10.15 5.66 -1.48 
 
6.68 2.46 12.98 4.46 -6.30 
 
8.41 2.16 9.33 3.90 -0.92 
 
t-value 3.94 1.19 3.83 2.67 -0.76 
 
3.27 1.33 4.86 1.99 -3.11 
 
3.86 0.99 3.54 1.90 -0.43 
Q5-8 return 14.63 -1.55 16.16 0.62 -1.52 
 
18.96 -5.52 16.90 5.69 2.16 
 
15.10 0.19 16.22 -1.17 -1.00 
 
t-value 4.07 -0.30 4.68 0.14 -0.48   5.36 -0.55 3.91 1.22 0.50   3.85 0.04 5.21 -0.27 -0.31 
Panel D2:  iv (low)                             
Q1 return 2.91 -0.41 3.91 0.97 -1.00 
 
3.30 1.22 3.38 0.81 -0.09 
 
3.57 0.35 4.48 1.37 -0.91 
 
t-value 3.16 -0.42 4.00 0.95 -1.23 
 
3.61 1.40 3.70 0.93 -0.13 
 
3.83 0.35 4.56 1.28 -1.20 
Q2 return 3.83 0.30 2.80 -3.47 1.02 
 
3.45 0.11 3.69 -1.63 -0.24 
 
3.88 -0.08 2.62 -2.58 1.26 
 
t-value 3.59 0.28 2.97 -2.48 1.32 
 
3.43 0.11 3.67 -1.40 -0.31 
 
3.93 -0.07 2.77 -1.75 1.64 
Q3-4 return 7.24 0.55 7.46 0.18 -0.22 
 
7.53 0.82 7.78 -0.55 -0.26 
 
6.69 -0.91 8.23 -0.80 -1.54 
 
t-value 4.30 0.39 4.66 0.11 -0.17 
 
4.51 0.70 4.98 -0.27 -0.24 
 
4.22 -0.46 4.95 -0.46 -1.38 
Q5-8 return 13.98 1.13 13.65 -1.61 0.33 
 
13.32 -0.74 11.85 -3.70 1.47 
 
13.21 1.60 15.01 0.58 -1.80 
 
t-value 6.18 0.35 6.59 -0.59 0.21 
 
5.73 -0.30 6.26 -1.58 1.01 
 
6.25 0.63 6.54 0.23 -0.97 
Table 8: institutional (daily) trading upon buy-back announcement, and stock return predictability 
This table reports the aggregate net institutional trading around the buy-back announcement and future stock returns. The daily net trading is obtained by 
aggregating the daily trades of all institutional clients of Abel/Noser Corp's for any trading day. In Panel A, we report the average trading across stocks from 
30 days before the buy-back announcement till 30 days after with varying windows. In addition we report the trading from the beginning of the 
announcement quarter to the day prior to the announcement date (QtrBgn , -1), and that from the announcement date to the end of the announcement quarter 
(0, QtrEnd). In Panel B we report the average institutional trading for stocks with low, medium, and high buy-back announcement returns based their CAR 
ranking during the announcement year. The event windows for announcement returns are 5-day (CAR(-2,+2)) and 11-day ( CAR (-5, +5)), respectively; and 
the correlating trading dates are (+3, 10) and (+6, 10), respectively. We next sort the sample firms with daily trading data into quintile portfolios based on 
their five-day trading upon buy-back announcement, and hold each portfolio for up to 12 months. We then examine the returns (in excess of the market 
return) for the portfolio with the most increase in institutional ownership ( top increase in IO) and those with the most decrease in institutional ownership (top 
decrease in IO), as well as the return difference between these two portfolios. Panel C reports the average returns across sample firms and event months. The 
sample period is from January 1999 to December 2008. The returns are in percentage. 
Panel A: institutional daily trading around buy-back announcement 
  
 
event dates 
  (QtrBgn , -1) (-30, -1) (-5, -1) (-1, 1) (0, 5) (0, 30) (0, QtrEnd) 
trading -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 
t-value -0.87 -0.61 -1.48 -1.76 -2.44 -2.02 -2.73 
Panel B: institutional daily trading around buy-back announcement: conditional announcement returns 
 event dates (+3, 10)  event dates (+6, 10) 
 CAR(-2,+2) CAR(-2,+2) CAR(-2,+2)  CAR(-5,+5) CAR(-5,+5) CAR(-5,+5) 
 
low medium high 
 
low medium high 
trading -0.03 -0.02 0.00  -0.03 -0.01 0.01 
t-value -2.01 -1.37 0.12  -1.97 -1.15 0.94 
Panel C: future stock returns following institutional 5-day trading upon buy-back announcement 
        
  
month 1 month 2 months 1 - 3 months 4 - 6 months 7-9 months 10 -12 
Top increase in IO return 1.24 1.61 3.84 0.83 1.64 2.44 
 
t-value 3.08 4.07 5.02 1.16 2.14 3.07 
Top decrease in IO return 0.94 0.20 2.06 1.09 2.48 1.35 
 
t-value 2.29 0.52 3.21 1.61 3.24 1.81 
Diff (Inc - Dec) return 0.30 1.41 1.78 -0.26 -0.84 1.09 
  t-value 0.53 2.58 1.78 -0.27 -0.78 1.00 
 
